In this paper, we present improvements of the algebraic side-channel analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) proposed in the works of M. Renauld and F.-X. Standaert. In particular, we optimize the algebraic representation of both the AES block cipher and obtained side-channel information, in the form of Hamming weights of intermediate states, in order to speed up the attack and increase its success rate. We study the perfor- mance of our improved attack in both known and unknown plaintext/ciphertext attack scenarios. Our experiments indicate that in both cases the amount of required side-channel information is less than the one required in the attacks introduced earlier. Furthermore, we introduce a method for handling erroneous side-channel information, which allows our improved algebraic side-channel attack (IASCA) to partially escape the assumption of an error-free environment and thus become applicable in practice. We demonstrate the practical use of our IASCA by inserting predictions from a single-trace template attack.
Introduction
When implementing a cryptographic algorithm, such as a block cipher, it is not only important to verify that the algorithm itself is secure against cryptanalysis, but also that an implementation of an algorithm does not unintentionally leak information about the processed data. Attacks that exploit such unintentionally leaked information to recover a cryptographic secret are called side-channel attacks. A recently introduced type of side-channel attack, the so-called algebraic side-channel attack (ASCA) [1, 2] , combines sidechannel attacks with algebraic techniques, i.e., algebraic system solving.
Inserting information from a side-channel attack into an algebraic system representing a cipher can allow an attacker to recover the secret key even when the number of traces measured during the attack phase is too low for statistical side-channel analysis to succeed. Since an algebraic representation is adaptable and descriptive, side-channel information about any processed intermediate value can be inserted into the algebraic system in order to enhance the key recovery process. Accordingly, the ASCA is a very powerful side-channel attack, when a profiling based attacker is assumed. However, the applicability of ASCA suffers from the necessity of correct information [1] . If erroneous information is inserted into the algebraic system, it is not correctly solvable, if solvable at all. This strongly limits the practical use of ASCA, since side-channel leakage yields only probabilistic information, especially if an attacker is assumed that is provided with only one trace in the attack phase. Recently, several contributions have appeared that address the issue of error tolerance [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . However, using our approach, for certain cases, is able to correct more errors within shorter periods of time under plausible leakage assumptions. Interestingly, the most recent contribution [7] goes beyond HW leakage model, whereas we stay in the more "classical" model here.
Our contribution
In this work, we propose a more practical algebraic sidechannel attack, the so-called improved algebraic side-channel attack (IASCA). The contribution of IASCA is twofold. First, we reduce the amount of information, which is required for solving the corresponding algebraic system by finding more effective algebraic representations. Secondly, we introduce a method for dealing with erroneous information, thus increasing the resistance of IASCA against errors. Both improvements contribute to the error tolerance of IASCA by decreasing potential points of failure on the one hand, and increasing the error resistance without assuming a bounded error as in [3] on the other hand. Finally, we demonstrate the practical applicability of IASCA on the block cipher AES-128. In the error-free case, we are able to find a secret key given only HWs of states of any two consecutive rounds. Then, in the case of erroneous side channel information, we can recover a key in 84 s. on average, given HWs of the first three rounds with only 9 % of HW information being correct. We can also deal with HW information from internal rounds only and are still able to recover the key under plausible assumption in a matter of seconds, see Table 9 .
This paper is an extended version of the conference paper [8] published at the Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST) 2012. Compared to this paper, we have added explanations to every technical point of our method. In particular, Sect. 4 now contains much more detailed explanation of the error tolerance handling. We compare our contribution to the recent works of [4, 5] . Lastly, we included a discussion about minimizing the overall solving time of the SAT solver in Sect. 6, which helps us to further increase the error tolerance of IASCA.
Organization
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we give preliminaries relevant to understanding the material of the paper. We describe our improved algebraic representation of the AES and give experimental results in Sect. 3. Section 4 outlines our approach for error tolerance in the improved side-channel attack and studies the performance of our attack in an erroneous environment. Section 5 provides an overview of and comparison with other related methods. In Sect. 6, we move towards answering the question of how one can reduce the overall solving time of the algebraic part of the attack. Finally, Sect. 7 concludes this paper.
Preliminaries

Algebraic cryptanalysis
In algebraic cryptanalysis, the inputs and outputs of a cryptographic primitive, e.g. AES [9] in our case, are related by a system of multivariate polynomial equations. We construct the system over GF (2) , the field of two elements 0 and 1, but other fields are possible [10] . After setting some variables to known values, e.g., a known plain/ciphertext pair, the system is attempted to be solved and the secret key is determined by the solution. However, finding a solution of the system is non-trivial. In fact, it has been shown that the problem of solving even quadratic systems of equations over GF (2) is NP-hard [11] . It is also known that solving random quadratic systems is hard on average [12] . Nevertheless, certain practical instances of the problem may be tractable, although many interesting instances are still out of reach in practice. There are several techniques available that can be employed to find a solution of a non-linear system. The one we mainly focus on is the SAT solving, since over GF (2) it appears to be the most suitable tool for our requirements. As the satisfiability problem (SAT) is the classical NP-complete problem, the area of SAT solving has received a lot of research in the past decades [13] and is one of the most efficient techniques available for algebraic cryptanalysis [14] [15] [16] . In this setting, the system of equations is translated into a set of clauses constituting an equivalent SAT instance, which is then fed into a SAT solver (e.g. CryptoMiniSAT [17] ) (see e.g. Chap. 13 of [18] ). The conversion of a solution of a SAT problem into a solution for the corresponding algebraic problem is usually straightforward.
The decisional SAT problem is about deciding if a given logical formula is satisfiable, i.e., if there is an assignment for the variables so that the formula evaluates to true. A search variant of the problem is to find such an assignment or to prove that it does not exist. W.l.o.g. the formula can be assumed to be in Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF). This means that the formula comprises a set of clauses, all assumed to be related by conjunctions. Each clause consists of a set of literals and each literal is either a variable or a negated variable. The literals are related by disjunctions. The following is a small example of a formula in CNF:
An assignment of variables x 1 = true, x 2 = false, x 3 = false makes the above logical formula true. Whereas the formula
is unsatisfiable (i.e., false for all possible assignments of variables).
The solver we are using in this work, CryptoMiniSat, is a so-called conflict-driven solver, which is based on the DPLL algorithm [19, 20] , proposed in 1960. This algorithm tries to search, as efficiently as possible using depth-first backtracking, the tree spanning all possible assignments for the variables, where every node corresponds to a variable and every branch to a possible assignment of this variable. The efficiency of the algorithm is essentially based on the repeated application of two techniques: unit propagation and pure literal elimination. The former means that clauses that contain only one literal can only be satisfied when this variable is assigned accordingly. A solver sets this forced value of a variable everywhere in the formula, therewith hoping to get further simplifications. The latter refers to the fact that variables that only appear exclusively as either positive or negative literals in the whole formula can be assigned in such a way that all clauses containing them are satisfied and can thus be eliminated from the problem. When successively assigning variables to traverse the tree, a clause might be found that is not satisfiable anymore. This is called a conflict. Upon finding such a conflict, conflict-driven solvers "learn" a new clause, a so-called conflict clause, to guide the further search.
Many modern solvers employ a range of other heuristics that have been empirically shown to improve the search. Using CryptoMiniSat deemed us to be a good choice, since it appears to be a good solver in general (it has won the SATRace 2010 1 ). Moreover, it is tuned to the problems coming from cryptanalysis [14] [15] [16] .
We have talked a lot about application of SAT solving so far, but of course it has to be mentioned that to apply this technique we first need to convert our system into a logical formula. A standard form for presenting polynomials is the Algebraic Normal Form (ANF), whereas a standard for SAT is CNF, as discussed above. There exist several techniques for converting ANF to CNF. One is based on looking at a form of a polynomial itself [18] : representing each monomial in CNF and then representing sums of monomials (polynomials) in CNF. The latter is a bottleneck for SAT, since XOR chains need exponentially large representation in CNF. To overcome this issue, one "cuts" a sum (a XOR chain) into several ones by introducing new variables; each sum is now of moderate size. One then represents each sum separately. The second method is based on considering the truth (value) table of a Boolean polynomial seen as a function, see Sect. 3.1. We use a combination of the two methods, where we mostly rely on the second method, but apply the cutting technique in the case we have to deal with linear expressions. In fact CryptoMiniSat was designed, in particular, to address the problem with handling XOR chains. In particular, CryptoMiniSat does Gaussian elimination on common blocks of XOR chains to eliminate variables, if possible, as opposed to attacking them directly with SAT techniques. Still, one has to deal with cutting chains separately.
Another approach to solve a system of non-linear equations is the Gröbner basis technique as described, e.g., in [21] . So far this has not been as efficient as SAT solving in this particular context. However, we apply Gröbner bases in substeps to improve SAT solving as explained in Sect. 3.1.
Of course, when applying SAT-solvers in algebraic cryptanalysis, the performance heavily depends on the encryption algorithm under attack. The focus of our study is on AES-128, which is a widely used block cipher [9] . It processes 128-bit blocks with 128-bit keys. AES is a substitution permutation network with ten rounds. The round function of AES consists of the key addition (where for each round a different key is used according to the key scheduling algorithm), the substitution layer composed of 16 8 × 8 S-boxes, and the linear diffusion layer that is a composition of ShiftRows and MixColumns operations. We refer to [9] for a detailed description of the algorithm.
So far, attacking the full AES with algebraic techniques was not successful, the reason being that the resulting algebraic system (and its equivalent SAT problem) is too large to be solved efficiently. On the other hand, the algebraic representation has the advantage of being able to incorporate almost any additional information, for example, side-channel information, as long as it is representable in algebraic form.
Side-channel analysis
Typically, side-channel attacks utilize a divide-and-conquer strategy such that different parts of a secret key are recovered separately (e.g., one byte of the secret key at a time). Moreover, in order to keep the complexity of the side-channel attack low, an attacker normally only exploits the physical leakage of rounds in which the diffusion is sufficiently low (e.g., the first or the last round). In 2002, the template attack [22] was introduced as the most powerful attack in the information theoretic sense, which assumes a rather strong adversary who posses an identical training device to build Bayesian templates (see Fig. 1 [23, 24] .
In the following, we briefly sketch the principle of the template attack. Moreover, we assume that the attacker tackles the first round of an AES-128 micro-controller implementation considering the HW leakage model, more precisely, the HWs of S(m ⊕ k), where m denotes one plaintext byte, k one key byte and S is the S-Box transformation of AES.
Let us assume that the adversary is provided with power trace vectors {l i w }
for each HW class w measured on a training device in the profiling phase. Since template attacks rely on a multivariate Gaussian noise model, the power trace vectors are considered to be drawn from a multivariate normal distribution. More precisely,
where N t is the number of points in time within the measured trace at which the attacker assumes the targeted operation to occur, i.e., l i w ∈ R N t . Accordingly, the construction of these templates is based on the estimation of the expected valueŝ μ w as well as the covariance matrixˆ w .
In the attack phase, the attacker measures trace vectors
i=1 on the device under attack with unknown w * and a fixed secret key. To reveal the secret subkey k, he uses the maximum-likelihood estimator [22] , given by
for each possible k. Note that, (*) relates to the evaluation of the leakage model, so the attacker computes the HW class w for each predicted k such as w = HW(S(m ⊕ k)). Thus, for each measurement the attacker gains information about the HW of the internally processed value and, therefore, since m is known, partial information about the secret subkey k. The adversary then chooses the k for which L k is maximal. Accordingly, side-channel attacks combine information of multiple traces to reveal the fixed secret key. However, if the number of traces in the attack phase is limited, classical side-channel attacks may not be able to reveal the secret key, since the information gain is too low. Moreover, if the secret key is modified before it is revealed [25] due to higher-level structures (e.g., protocols), classical side-channel attacks are ineffective.
Algebraic side-channel analysis
Algebraic side-channel analysis benefits from both areas: algebraic cryptanalysis and side-channel attacks, see Fig. 2 . It is assumed that the attacker is provided with a sufficient number of power traces for profiling, whereas he is limited to a small number of power traces (e.g., only one trace) in the attack phase, such that classical side-channel attacks would usually fail. However, instead of exploiting side-channel information from only one round as in the classical case, the attacker captures as much leakage as possible to provide the algebraic system with adequate information. Accordingly, the attacker does not combine the information about the HWs as in Eq. (1) 
As depicted in Fig. 2 after conducting the side-channel attack, he then utilizes the likelihoods L w to generate clauses, which are then inserted into the algebraic system.
In [1] , Renauld et al. first presented an implementation of the Algebraic Side-Channel Attack (ASCA) applied to AES-128. They also employed the HW leakage model and analyzed the amount of side-channel information necessary to make the attack practically feasible. Since Renauld et al. elaborate sufficiently on the potential intermediate values and their potential leakages, we constraint ourselves to a brief summary (and refer to [1] for further details): we assume potential leakages at each byte of the state before and after the substitution layer and 52 additional potential leakages during the MixColumn operation, resulting in 2×16+52 = 84 leakages per round and 84×9+32 = 788 leakages over all (since the last round does not contain the MixColumn operation). Note that operations of the key schedule are not targeted.
The main drawback of ASCA is the inability to deal with erroneous side-channel predictions. If the side-channel attack yields a wrong HW prediction that leads to a wrong set of clauses inserted into the algebraic system, the SAT solver will not be able to determine a correct solution. Unfortunately, side-channel analysis has to deal with a noisy environment and thus errors in predictions are unwanted, but inevitable. A first approach on dealing with erroneous predictions was tolerant ASCA (TASCA), suggested in [3] . The authors proposed to utilize pseudo-boolean optimization to cope with an error, bounded to ±1 of the prediction, see Sect. 5.1 for details.
3 IASCA: improved algebaic representation of ASCA
Algebraic representation
While Renauld et al. successfully demonstrated the feasibility of ASCA, its potential was not fully exhausted. We demonstrate in this section that it is possible to reduce solving times and the amount of necessary side channel information, thus increasing the practicability of the attack, simply by tweaking the algebraic representation.
To improve on the work in [1] , we optimize the representation of the SAT problem to reduce solving times. At first sight, it is not immediately clear what characteristics a "good" representation would have. An important characteristic of a SAT instance appears to be the size of the problem, not only in the number of variables but also in the number of clauses. However, considering the way SAT solvers work-building a search tree, exploring it while learning conflict clauses and trying to cut branches efficiently ( [18] )-the average length of clauses is also a suitable, though simple, heuristic measure, since short clauses may produce conflicts or yield a solution sooner than long clauses. It follows that introducing short clauses may improve the representation, even though increasing the size of the instance.
Effective algebraic representation of the AES S-Box is crucial for further solving. For such a representation, Renauld et al. used standard representation of a Boolean function in CNF by examining its truth (or value) table. For a Boolean function in n input and m output variables this results in a logical formula, which CNF has m ·2 n clauses of length n +1 in n + m variables. In the case of the AES S-Box we have n = m = 8 and this results in a CNF with 2,048 clauses, each of length 9. There exist ways of optimizing the above method by applying different tricks during the truth table examination. The ideas go back to, e.g. Karnaugh [26] . In our case, we used a converter implementing these ideas that converts Boolean functions in algebraic normal form (ANF) into their logical representation in CNF: PolyBoRi's CNF converter [27] . The idea there is to simplify a CNF one can obtain directly from the truth table by finding the so-called prime blocks, a special grouping of variables, see [27] for more details. One distinctive feature of the converter in [27] is that it is not necessary to compute a truth table of a formula in advance, which, however, is not really relevant in our case.
In order to use the converter, we first obtained explicit equations of degree 7 that describe the AES S-Box:
, where x = (x 1 , . . . , x 8 ) denotes the input of an S-box, and y i the ith output bit of an S-box. After running the converter, we obtain a CNF with 946 clauses with average length of 7.22. Table 1 lists the numbers of occurrences of clauses of certain lengths in both representations. Furthermore, we tried to exploit the restrictions the S-box operation has on the HW of its input and output. Specifically, we included short clauses for the case that the input and output of a certain S-box are known.
First note that for all possible input and output pairs of the S-box, there are 47 possible corresponding HW pairs (e.g., the input/output pair x = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0) and y = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1) corresponds to the H pair (3, 7). For each HW pair, we will denote its count as the number of input/output pairs that correspond to that pair. Table 2 shows all HW pairs and their counts. Also note that the HW of a byte x can be represented as a set of equations over GF (2) in the variables denoting the bits of x. To see this, let HW(x) = w, where HW(·) denotes the HW function. It holds that HW(x) = w iff every w + 1 sized subset of the bits of x contains at least one 0 and every 8 − w + 1 sized subset contains at least one 1. These two conditions can be enforced using the following equations for all such subsets:
where X a is a subset of the variables representing the bits of x with |X a | = a. A logical representation in CNF of the above is as follows:
where we use the correspondence 0 ↔ True, 1 ↔ False. For each of the possibly occurring HW pairs (i.e., with count > 0), we considered the set of equations defining the S-box operation and included the equations specifying the corresponding HWs of the input and output. From this set, we derived a set of short equations using Gröbner bases techniques and converted them to clauses using the PolyBoRi's CNF converter. While this worked very well for HW pairs with low count, it resulted in rather long clauses for pairs with a count larger than 7. To avoid long clauses, we used a different approach for these HW pairs. Instead of computing Gröbner bases, we considered all possible clauses of length l with l being reasonably small (l ≤ 3) and checked, which ones are satisfied by all input/output pairs that correspond to a certain (high count) HW pair. Note, that there are exactly 16 l · 2 l distinct potential clauses of length l, since every clause can contain n out of the 16 variables (8 input and 8 output bits) and every variable can appear as a positive or a negative literal. This exhaustive search is computationally feasible for small l. Table 3 shows the number of clauses of length 1, 2, and 3 included for each high count Hamming weight pair. Finally, this yielded a set of very short clauses for each HW pair, which was added to the SAT instance in case the HWs of an input/output pair of an S-box are known due to side-channel information.
We mention that the work on studying behavior of Gröbner bases of an ideal I generated by the S-box equations and HW equations has been undertaken in [28] . In particular, Table  2 is considered there. Still, that paper deals more with the question of finding low degree polynomials in the ideal I and not polynomials whose representation in CNF is short (although these questions are somewhat related).
Next, we optimize the representation of the HW leakage in the linear diffusion layer of the AES. Since the variables in the equation system correspond to bits of (intermediate) states, most linear operations can be mapped directly to the algebraic representation. The implementation that we study employs the so-called xtime operation on a byte, as defined in [9] , as a subroutine of the MixColumn operation. Renauld et al. represent this operation by eight linear equations in eight input and eight output variables-one for each output variable depending on the eight input variables. The equations have a length between 3 and 5 (including the output variables). From Sect. 4.2.1 in [9] , we obtained the following-significantly shorter-representation with input x and output y:
where k i = 1 for i ∈ {1, 3, 4}, k i = 0 for all other i, and indices are computed modulo 8. Using these equations, we have reduced the representation of the xtime operation from eight equations of length between 3 and 5 variables to eight equations of length between 2 and 3 variables. Since the xtime operation is applied to each byte in every MixColumn operation, this yields a significantly more compact equation system. This directly leads to a more compact CNF, because we did not use the PolyBoRi's CNF converter for any of the linear equations, but rather the direct conversion technique originally implemented by Renauld et al.
In a similar fashion as described above for the S-box operation, we considered all possible pairs of HWs of the input and output of the xtime operation, added the HW specifying equations to the representation above and computed Gröbner bases (a row echelon form in this linear case) to obtain short equations. These are again translated to clauses to add to the SAT instance in the case the HW of the input and the output of the operation is known. Note that for the xtime operation no exhaustive search for short clauses was necessary.
Experimental results
In this section, we present experimental results which demonstrate the performance of our improved algebraic side channel attack. We used the same assumptions as in [1] . For the experiments presented here, we do not perform a power analysis attack, but assume that all HWs are given and correct. For these experiments, we used both the standard Java implementation of ASCA by Renauld [1] 2 and our modified implementation IASCA 3 . We used the SAT solver CryptoMiniSat [17] to solve CNF instances produced by ASCA and IASCA. For each attack scenario each result is obtained as an average over 100 runs using different plain-ciphertext pairs. Furthermore, for all experiments presented here we set 3,600 s as a time limit. Since we assume error free predictions, all attacks will be successful, given an infinite amount of time and enough information to result in a unique solution.
To measure the performance of our approach, we, therefore, consider an attack a failure if the required time for determining a valid solution exceeds the time limit of 3,600 s. We run all the experiments on a Sun X4440 server, with four "QuadCore AMD Opteron™ Processor 8356" CPUs and 128 GB of RAM. Each CPU is running at 2.3 GHz. Tables 4 and 5 report our experiments for several attack scenarios where a plaintext/ciphertext is known and where plaintext/ciphertext is unknown, respectively. In these experiments, we compared our results obtained using Renauld's ASCA and IASCA with the results reported in [1] . Our comparison is based on the required HWs to recover the secret key with the rate of success higher than 90 % in less than 3,600 s. Table 4 shows that in the case of consecutive HWs, IASCA needs at most only the HWs of any two consecutive internal rounds to find the secret key. In Fig. 3 , we explain how IASCA can attack any two rounds with 100 % rate of success (Fig. 3b) in less than 5 s (Fig. 3a) , while ASCA failed to recover the key in many cases in less than 3,600 s (as R 6 and R 7 ). As an example, we compare the performance of IASCA and ASCA when they use the HWs of Rounds 4 and 5 (see Fig. 4 ). Note that attacking intermediate rounds is harder than attacking R 1 and R 2 . For example, attacking R 5 and R 6 is harder than other combinations of consecutive two rounds. This may have to do with the fact that a solver needs more time before it can get to use the HW information from the middle rounds, as opposed to HW information being placed closer to the "ends" of the system. This circumstance is often overlooked and claims on the number of rounds often implicitly mean R 1 and R 2 .
In this scenario, it can be inferred that the SAT solver uses the system constructed by IASCA to recover a value of the round key between the selected two consecutive rounds. Afterwards, it uses the key schedule relations and the known plaintext/ciphertext to retrieve the correct value of the secret key. In the scenario of randomly distributed known HWs over all rounds (788 HW), IASCA requires 394 HW. Moreover, IASCA can recover the secret key using only 68 random HWs from the first round with the rate of success greater than 95 %, while ASCA needs all the 84 HWs of the first round. Table 5 shows that for IASCA, only 184 consecutive HWs are sufficient to recover the secret key in an unknown plain/ciphertext scenario. More precisely, as mentioned above, we need all the HWs of two consecutive rounds R i and R i+1 (168 HW) to recover the value of the round key k i and the HWs of the input state of round R i+2 (16 HW) to determine the correct value of k i in case we have multiple values. However, given only two consecutive rounds, we have a 70 % rate of success using IASCA. In case of the random HW scenario, where the known HWs are distributed randomly over all potential leakages, IASCA needs only 472 HWs distributed randomly over all rounds with rate of success ≥ 90 %.
Error tolerance
Most contributions on algebraic side-channel attacks, for instance [1] , assume an error-free set of HWs. However, due to several kinds of noise (e.g., electronic noise, quantization noise, and switching noise), the emitted side-channel leakage may lead to falsified HW predictions [29] . If such an erroneous HW prediction is inserted into the algebraic system, the SAT solver will not be able to determine a correct solution. In the following, we extend IASCA with the capability of dealing with errors. The idea behind our approach is to generalize the algebraic representation so that it includes also the correct HW to a high certainty.
Error tolerance by generalization
Let W = {x ∈ N 0 |x ≤ 8} describe all possible HWs for an eight-bit vector. So far we have constructed the clauses by assuming that the equation HW(x) = w with w ∈ W holds. This equation can also be expressed by two inequalities, where one inequality is HW(x) ≤ w and the other HW(x) ≥ w. Both inequalities can be described by a set of clauses, see
Since we are now able to describe an interval of Hamming weights using equations, we need to specify further measures in order to exactly describe our experimental environment. Thus, we introduce the terms correctness and descriptiveness. By correctness, we refer to the likelihood that the correct Hamming weight is contained in our interval. Descriptiveness refers to the amount of information that is provided by describing the interval using equations. Suppose we have an interval in which we want the correct HW to be contained. If we increase the bounds of the interval, we thereby increase the correctness, but on the other hand decrease the descriptiveness. Similarly, we can use correctness and descriptiveness to refer to a set of intervals, i.e., if we have a set of intervals the correctness describes how likely it is that all intervals contain their corresponding correct HW, while descriptiveness describes the combined amount of information of all intervals.
To measure the trade-off between correctness and descriptiveness, we introduce a new notion, called the error classes. We define the error class E i,w for HW w ∈ W as a set of all possible intervals of length i that include w, more precisely,
In other words, each element e i,w in E i,w denotes an interval of length i that contains the HW w. Additionally, we define the error class E i as Note that E i is independent of w. So, E i describes the union of all sets on W with length i. Moreover, it holds that
Of course, the prediction of an interval of HWs instead of one single HW has an impact on the improvement we proposed in Sect. 3. Since the HWs of the input and the output of the S-boxes may be incorrect, the additional short clauses have to be adjusted accordingly. Say, the HW predictions of the input/output pair (w x , w y ) are (X, Y ) and an error class of E x and E y , i.e., X ⊆ W is a set with x elements and Y ⊆ W is a set with y elements. In this case, instead of adding the short clauses for the pair (X, Y ), we add the cross product of the intervals for all HW pairs in X × Y , thus making sure that all HW pairs satisfy the clauses. Naturally, the number of clauses decreases with increasing error classes of w x and w y .
Note that we assume the predicted HWs to be consecutive. This is a realistic assumption, since if the HW leakage model correctly describes the power consumption of our device, consecutive HWs have a similar likelihood. However, if the assumed HWs are not consecutive, a larger interval of HWs must be chosen such that the minimum and maximum predicted HW define the limits of an interval. Also note that our approach is not restricted in the size of the interval and thus in the severity of the error.
Test setup and template attack
In the following, we evaluate the performance of our error tolerant IASCA by generating clauses obtained by conducting a template attack on a microcontroller executing an AES-128 encryption. We perform the attack on an ATMega256-1 microcontroller for which the Hamming weight leakage model adequately describes the power consumption. For our measurement setup, we connected the microcontroller to an external power supply and an external frequency generator and measured its power consumption with a PicoScope 6000. We implemented the AES, which start we marked by a rising trigger on an external pin, and performed a template attack using a template base of 5,000 measurements. The templates were created for the S-box input and output of each round as well as the intermediate values of MixColumns, as described in Sect. 3, i.e., for 788 values in total. We utilized a singletrace template attack (i.e., N 2 = 1), and, in order to achieve a decisive result about the precision, repeated the attack 2,000 times with varying plaintext/key pairs.
Estimating the error tolerance of IASCA
When performing ASCA, one would represent the predicted (in our case most likely) HW as a set of clauses, which would then be inserted into the algebraic system. However, this approach relies on a template attack that always predicts the correct HW, which is an unrealistic assumption in practice. Therefore, we suggest to utilize the generalization of clauses as discussed in Sect. 4.1 to describe an interval of Hamming weights rather than a single HW, thereby lessening the dependence on a correct prediction of the template attack. However, describing a larger set of HWs reduces the descriptiveness of the clauses and increases the solving time of the SAT solver. Thus, we have to find a trade-off between maximizing the possibility that the correct HW is contained in the predicted set and minimizing the number of elements, contained in the set. We tackle this problem by introducing an additional phase, the so-called precision estimation phase, which is carried out after the profiling phase of the template attack, cf. Fig. 5. 
Estimating the precision of the template attack
To first get an estimation of the precision of our template attack, we analyze the resulting predictions using a set of measurements that were not used in the profiling phase and for which the key and plaintext are known. Ideally, this set can be obtained by leaving out some measurements in the profiling phase of the side-channel analysis. In our experiments, we used 1,000 measurements from which we gained 788,000 predictions.
For each prediction we obtained a likelihood vector L and computed the correct HW.
For each prediction, we obtain a likelihood vector L, as depicted in Fig. 6 4 . In this example, the template attack predicts the HW 6 to be the most likely, even though Hamming weight 5 is the correct one. To get a first overview over the predictions of the template attack, we sort the likelihood vector L in descending order of probability. Sticking to the example, one achieves the order displayed in Table 6 . We observe that the correct Hamming weight is ranked as third most likely HW by the template attack. Thus, we have to (at least) consider the interval [5, 7] in order to include the correct HW, which results in the error class E 2 .
The occurrence of the error classes for the 788,000 prediction is displayed in Table 7 . Two things are notable about the resulting occurrence of error classes. First, the template attack predicts only in 28 % of all predictions the correct HW. So, it is very unlikely to find a subset of predictions that is correct and would, therefore, be suitable for ASCA. Second, one can see that the error is not bounded to E 2 (±1), since E 3 occurs in 4 % of all predictions.
However, in an actual attack, the only indication is the likelihood vector L without the knowledge of the correct Hamming weight class. We, therefore, describe next a strategy how to proceed in an actual attack knowing the occurrence of error classes.
Precision estimation phase
Now that we have computed the occurrences we have an estimation about the precision of the template attack. Note that it is not our goal to improve the precision of our template 4 Note that this example was chosen as one of the less accurate predictions of the template attack. Table 6 A certainty vector of the template attack (cf. Fig. 6 ) sorted in descending order of probability Table 7 Occurrences of the error classes in the precision estimation phase
Error class
Occurrence (%) 28 44 24 4 0 attack. Improving the precision of the template attack is a part of the side-channel analysis and will not be tackled in this work. Our goal is rather to estimate the error class of each prediction (hence the name "precision estimation phase"), given the likelihood of each HW. Thus, the distribution of error classes, depicted in Table 7 , is an upper bound of the amount of information we will receive. Until now, we computed the error classes using the correct Hamming weight. However, in an actual attack, we would not know the correct HW and thus would not be able to compute the error class using the approach in Sect. 4.3.1. Therefore, we have to identify the error class using only the likelihood of each HW that we obtained from the template attack.
Using Table 7 , we can observe that the correct HW always is among the four most likely Hamming weights. The straight-forward approach to estimate the error class would thus be to assume the highest determined error class (in our case E 3 ) for every prediction. However, while this approach would guarantee the correctness, it decreases the descriptiveness by omitting a lot of information since only 4 % of all predictions are actually in E 3 .
Thus, we use an alternative approach that tries to increase the descriptiveness while maintaining the correctness. The idea of our approach is to increase the interval of HWs until we can be sufficiently certain that the predicted interval contains the correct HW. We measure the certainty that our interval contains the correct HW by accumulating the likelihood of the predictions of the HW that we include in the interval. To describe a sufficient level of certainty, we introduce a certainty threshold T , cf. [8] . The accumulated certainty from the Hamming weights, contained in the interval, must exceed the certainty threshold in order for the interval to be described as a set of clauses that is used in the SAT solver. Also, in order to maximize the descriptiveness, we choose the interval that has the least number of elements. More precisely, we choose the interval using the function f :
for W ⊆ W. Note that the certainty threshold does not equal to the likelihood of the interval containing the correct HW. That is, a certainty threshold of T = 85 % does not imply that 15 % of all intervals do not contain the correct HW. The certainty threshold is merely a measure of confidence in the prediction of the template attack. The difference in the confidence and the actual likelihood occur, because the template attack uses a Gaussian model for its prediction.
In [8] , a brute-force approach was suggested in order to receive a suitable certainty threshold T . Since this brute-force approach may not be practical in the attack phase, we suggest a new method to estimate the certainty threshold T using an independent set of measurement traces. For this purpose, the attacker should be able to know the internally processed Hamming weights and thus should be able to calculate the actual error classes e i,w . We then suggest to estimate the certainty threshold T as the average accumulated likelihood considering all appeared error classes with:
where the superscript (n) reflects the consideration of the nth measurement trace and N is the total number of power traces used for the estimation.
As an example consider again Table 6 . Since the correct HW is 5, we have e 2,5 = [5, 7] . If we compute T using Eq. (9) with N = 1, we obtain T = 67.7 %. The thereby determined certainty threshold T is then used in the attack Consider as an example the prediction depicted in Table 8 . Suppose we calculated our certainty threshold T = 67.7 % as explained before. We, therefore, would choose the interval of HWs, from which we compute the clauses that we insert into the algebraic system, such that their accumulated probability exceeds 67.7 %. In the first iteration, we identify the interval as [2, 2] and its corresponding accumulated probability as 44.3 %. Since 44.3 < 67.7 %, we add the second most likely HW to our interval and accumulate its probability. This yields the interval [1, 2] as well as an accumulated probability of 61.7 %, which is still smaller than our certainty threshold. Thus, we add the third most likely predicted HW, resulting in the interval [1, 3] and an accumulated probability of 72.8 %, which exceeds our predefined certainty threshold. Thereby, determined interval [1, 3] is then represented with clauses that are inserted into the algebraic system. Note that we also would have exceeded the certainty threshold using the interval [0, 2]. However, since the HW 3 is more likely than HW 0 we prefer the interval [1, 3] .
Evaluation of IASCA in the presence of errors
To determine the error tolerance of IASCA, we evaluate two facts. First, we determine the distribution of error classes we receive when using different certainty thresholds T = {80, 85, 90, 95, 98, 99 %} to determine the minimum certainty threshold resulting in 100 % correct information (cf. [8] ). Moreover, we show that our new approach [cf., Eq. (9)] results in the same minimum certainty threshold. Thus, using Eq. (9) requires much less time and computing effort, since the need for brute-forcing the minimum certainty threshold is eliminated. Secondly, we analyze the minimum amount of HW information (in rounds) and solving time when inserting the identified intervals, represented by clauses, into the algebraic system. Furthermore, we set 100 s as an upper bound of computation time. The results are depicted in Table 9 . We will discuss the (arbitrary) limitation on the computation time, i.e., 100 s, in Sect. 6. As expected, a higher certainty threshold yields a higher correctness (cor), but decreases the descriptiveness. After T = 95 %, the correctness is fulfilled and thus using a higher threshold only results in an unnecessary decrease in descriptiveness. This can be seen by the correctness being 100 % after T = 95 % and the increasing amount of side channel information and time, required to solve the algebraic system. Note that the certainty threshold T = 95 % has also been pre-calculated using our new method described in Eq. (9) . Thus, in this case, the attacker needs to perform the algebraic cryptanalysis part only once as depicted in Fig. 5 , since using T = 95 % gains a correctness of 100 %.
IASCA solved the system for T = 95 % in 84 s on average and required the HW information for the first three rounds. For T = 98 %, we were only able to solve the algebraic system in half of the cases while requiring 100 s in average given the HW information of all rounds. When we used the error classes for T = 99 %, we were not able to solve the system, even though we added all information.
Moreover, we are also interested in the performance of IASCA for the predicted sets for T ∈ {80, 85, 90 %}. However, these thresholds resulted in clauses that did not describe the correct HW, we had to change them such that the distribution of error classes remained the same, but the correct HW was contained in the interval. We then generated the corresponding clauses for the interval and inserted them into the algebraic system. IASCA was able to recover the correct key while only requiring the predictions of the first round for a certainty threshold of T = {80, 85 %}. For T = 90 % we could solve the system in 3 s using only the HW predictions of round 1 and round 2.
Note that even though we were not able to solve the algebraic system for all thresholds, the results still seem promising. In the case of T = 80 %, we consider only 35 % correctly predicted Hamming weights and were still able to solve the algebraic system in only two seconds. For T = 90 %, IASCA successfully solved the algebraic system using only the first two rounds within 3 s, even when E 3 was considered. For T = 95 %, IASCA needs 84 s, but we assume only 9 % correctly predicted HWs and a presence of 18 % of sets with four HWs.
Notably, we are even able to deal with erroneous information, if we have HWs from the middle rounds: 3-8. At the bottom of Table 9 , we present the results. These results are important, since in practice some first/last rounds are sometimes masked, so it makes harder for an attacker to get the HWs of the internal states in those rounds. We show that even if we are in the case, where only 9 % of the HW information is correct, we are able to recover the key on average in around 10 s, if we are given (erroneous) HW information in the rounds from 3 to 8.
Comparison with other related techniques
Parallel to this work, there are two other contributions in the field of algebraic side-channel analysis that also tackle the error tolerance called TASCA [4, 7] and MDASCA [5] (also known as Set-ASCA [6] ). Note that although all three contributions tackle the same problem and perform similar experiments, to the best of our knowledge, they have developed independently of each other.
TASCA on AES
The first contribution by Oren et al. [4] applies the pseudoboolean optimization approach to obtain TASCA of [3, 4, 7] to the block cipher AES. The authors compared ASCA, TASCA, and Set-ASCA [6] in the context of error free and erroneous predictions given only the plaintext or ciphertext. In their analysis, the authors especially concentrated on the scenario where the key is not uniquely determinable due to an insufficient amount of side-channel information.
The authors first analyzed the minimal information for which ASCA, TASCA, and Set-ASCA are still able to recover the key, resulting in similar findings as stated in this work. For their experiments, 100 HW 5 of the first round were sufficient for ASCA to recover the key given only the plaintext or ciphertext. However, due to the restriction to only known plaintext or ciphertext, the authors encountered the problem that the algebraic system was sometimes not uniquely solvable. Thus, the authors considered a recovery successful if the recovered key only varied in 4 out of the 16 bytes from the original key.
The comparison in the erroneous scenario was performed between TASCA and Set-ASCA, since standard ASCA cannot cope with errors. The authors used the 100 HWs of the first round, chose a random i with 0 ≤ i ≤ 25 % and changed the error class of i % of the 100 HWs to E k with k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Subsequently, TASCA and Set-ASCA were used to recover the key given the modified predictions and the plaintext. It was shown that TASCA was able to recover a sufficiently correct (4 bytes different from the correct key) key even when the error class was raised to E 3 . Set-ASCA, on the other hand, succeeded in only 9.2 % when the error class was chosen as E 1 and completely failed when the error class was chosen as E 2 or E 3 . The authors explained the superior performance of TASCA as the consequence of the pseudo-boolean optimization in combination with the high number of possible keys. While Set-ASCA ranks all possible keys as equally likely and stops after determining the first possible key, TASCA determines the key that maximizes a specified target function. Thus, the solution returned by a TASCA execution is more similar to the correct key while the solution found by Set-ASCA is randomly distributed among the possible keys that satisfy the satisfiability problem.
The strong point of IASCA is on a fast key recovery when the key is uniquely determinable, i.e., when having the plaintext and ciphertext or sufficient information about intermediate variables. In this scenario, as shown in this contribution, IASCA can handle the occurrence of high errors classes and allows to assign error classes more fine-grained and flexible than [4] , which always uses fixed error classes.
Multiple deductions-based ASCA (MDASCA)
The second contribution, called Multiple Deductions-based ASCA (MDASCA) [5] , is also known as set-ASCA [6] . Similar to IASCA, MDASCA also uses a generalization approach to describe multiple predictions of a leakage model (e.g., the HW leakage model).
MDASCA was described in general terms and its application was demonstrated on AES using three different leakage models: the HW leakage model, the access driven cache leakage model, and the trace driven cache leakage model. In the analysis that uses the HW leakage model, the authors performed experiments, similar to the experiments performed in this work. To recover the HWs of intermediate values, the authors performed a side-channel attack on an 8-bit ATMega324P microcontroller using the Pearson correlation. Unfortunately, the authors did not go into more detail about their side-channel attack, especially on how they were able to compute the Pearson correlation coefficient for only one attack trace and whether they require a profiling phase.
On the side of algebraic modeling, the authors of [5] seem to choose the representation of an S-box in the form of implicit quadratic equations. This form is generally accepted in trying to analyze the AES with Gröbner basis methods [10, 21] , but is perhaps not so well suited for SATsolving, since one would deal with long XOR chains here that would require many additional variables for cutting them, see Sect. 2.1. Moreover, the authors do not specify which ANFto-CNF conversion method they use, which leaves space for ambiguous understanding.
Similarly to our work and [4] , the authors first tried to identify the minimal number of required HWs that MDASCA needs to recover the key in the error-free scenario using the same settings as in [1] . The authors then compared their results with the minimal HW for ASCA as stated in [1] and found that their approach drastically decreased the minimal required information. However, note that the authors did not perform the comparison between MDASCA and ASCA on a fair base, i.e., compared them using the same instances and running on the same machine. This is especially unfortunate, since the results of this and related work [4] show that ASCA indeed performs better in the error-free scenario than stated in [1] . Also, at a first glance, the performance of MDASCA in [5] seems very similar to the performance of ASCA in this work. This is confirmed by the analysis of Oren et al. in [4] who observed that the performance of Set-ASCA (which is identical to MDASCA) in the error free context is identical to the performance of standard ASCA.
Subsequently, the authors analyzed the performance of MDASCA in the erroneous prediction scenario by assuming an error class of E 2 for certain predictions. However, the authors did not specify how they chose the predictions for which they increased the error class. MDASCA was then able to recover the correct key in a mean time of 600 s using the HW predictions from the first three consecutive rounds containing 20 % predictions from E 0 and E 2 6 . Lastly, the authors wrote that MDASCA could recover the correct key in a mean time of 120 s when using the predicted HWs from the first three (two) consecutive rounds even if all predictions were from E 2 by analyzing two (three) attack traces. However, the authors did not give any further information on how the attack traces were combined. This makes an evaluation of MDASCA on multiple attack traces very difficult, since the results can become very misleading if a simple combination is used. Consider for example, the case where two predictions p 1 = {3, 4, 5} and p 2 = {5, 6, 7} for the same intermediate value using the same plaintext and key are combined using a simple set intersection. In this case, the combined prediction p c = p 1 ∩ p 2 = {5} is from error class E 0 instead of E 2 . If the authors indeed used such a similar approach, this experiment is actually of little significance and might lead to confusion in the performance results.
Although the application scenario of MDASCA and IASCA is very similar, a direct and fair comparison given only the results in [5] is, unfortunately, not possible. However, we still see major structural advantages of IASCA over MDASCA:
1. IASCA can select error classes more fine-grained than MDASCA, thereby increasing the exploitation of information. 2. IASCA utilizes an optimized representation of the AES S-box, which decreases the solving time and the required information. 3. IASCA builds data-dependent clauses that describe predictions in an efficient way. 4 . IASCA has been shown not to be limited to bounded errors. 5. The side-channel phase of IASCA utilizes more investigated attack methods.
Beyond the Hamming weight
In a recent work, Oren et al. [7] analyzed the performance of TASCA and Set-ASCA when using leakage probabilities and a leakage model other than the HW model. They simulated a template attack on an AES round and thereby obtained a likelihood for each of the 256 different values of each leak. Subsequently, they transformed these likelihoods into appropriate clauses for Set-ASCA and a constraint-set and goal term for TASCA. They found that Set-ASCA is able to correctly determine a solution faster when sufficient information is inserted into the algebraic system but its runtime drastically increases if the amount of information is reduced. TASCA, on the other hand, is slower in case of a higher amount of information but its runtime does not increase as drastically as Set-ASCA.
Minimizing the solving time
The amount of side-channel information that is added to the algebraic system to determine a solution is crucial in two ways. If the key can be uniquely determined, then adding less side channel information corresponds to a lower probability of error. However, less information also implies a higher solving time of a SAT solver. Methods that reduce the overall solving time of a SAT solver are, therefore, beneficial since we require less side-channel information to solve the system, which again reduces the probability of adding an error.
The initial discussion about the solving time of an algebraic system enhanced with the side-channel information was done in [1] . Renauld et al. analyzed the distribution of the solving time for different instances (i.e., plaintext and key combinations) and found that the solving time follows an exponential distribution. Thus, there exists some small number of instances that require a much higher solving time than the majority of instances. This property of SAT solving techniques is well known, see e.g., [18] . Subsequently, Renauld et al. performed the same experiment on a fixed instance but used a different random seed for the SAT solver. The random seed caused the SAT solver to use a different solving strategy, thereby changing the solving time. The resulting time distribution again followed an exponential distribution. To cope with hard instances, Renauld et al. proposed to stop the execution of the SAT solver after a fixed time (e.g., 100 s) and to start the SAT solver again with a different random seed.
In this section, we build on the work of [1] by relaxing the assumption that we have only one plaintext/ciphertext pair with corresponding side-channel information during the attack phase. Relaxing this assumption allows us to reduce the mean solving time of the SAT solver. In particular, we show how to determine a time threshold after which the SATsolver should be restarted to reduce the overall solving time. Equivalently, we may say that less side-channel information is needed per pair to solve an instance in given time. Decreasing the required information is especially essential in scenarios where the side-channel analysis is restricted to the number of internal values for which it can determine information. Such a restriction can arise due to a localized masking scheme or concurrent operations during specific encryption steps.
Distribution of solving time
To get an understanding of the distribution of the solving time, we computed the solving time for different plaintext/ciphertext pairs in the known plaintext/ciphertext scenario for 100 instances using 50 HWs (32 HWs of the first round's S-box input and output as well as 18 HWs of the second round's S-box input and output). Using a time limit of 3,600 s we were able to solve all instances. The distribution of the solving time is depicted in Fig. 9 and also follows the exponential distribution, depicted in [1] , Fig. 7 . We observe that half of the instances can be solved in a very short time (i.e., less than 2 s). The number of instances that are solved in subsequent time slots decreases dramatically. Also there still exist five instances that require a solving time of more than 100 s.
To verify whether this distribution also holds when less information is inserted into the algebraic system, we repeated the experiments again for 90 plaintext/ciphertext pairs using only 42 HWs (32 HWs of the first round's S-box input and output as well as 10 HWs of the second round S-box input and output) and a time limit of 86,400 s (one day). Under this settings, we were able to solve 52 % of all instances. The distribution of the solving times is depicted in Fig. 10 . As expected, we can again observe an exponential distribution of the solving time of the instances. Ranking the instances by their solving time, we can divide them into three groups: (1) 18 instances for which we could solve the algebraic system in less than 1,000 s (easy instances), (2) nine instances that could be solved in a time between 1,000 and 10,000 s (medium instances), and (3) eight instances that required more than 10,000 s, also including the 43 instances that we could not solve in a time span of 86,400 s (hard instances). Compared to the distribution, depicted in Fig. 9 , the distribution in Fig. 10 is more shallow, i.e., there is a huge time difference between solving an easy instance and a hard instance.
Lastly, we computed the distribution of solving times when changing the random seed for one plaintext/ciphertext using again the scenario with 50 HWs. Although, the exponential distribution of the solving time was observable, it was not as distinctive as in the case of a different instance. In particular, instances with a high solving time using one random seed also had a high solving time using a different random seed. Thus, while changing the random seed in our setup can lead to an improvement in the solving time, the overall solving time might not be improved by much when restarting the SAT solver using a different random seed. Therefore, in our analysis, we will focus on a scenario with varying plaintext/ciphertext.
Breaking the weakest link
As has been shown above, the solving time of a SAT solver is exponentially distributed. Thus, if given multiple plaintext/ciphertext pairs with the same amount of internal information, the overall time for recovering the key can be decreased by stopping a SAT solver at a certain threshold time t and restarting it on a different plaintext/ciphertext pair. In the following, we discuss how to determine this threshold time t such that the overall solving time of the SAT solver becomes minimal. Note that the solution we present assumes independence on the plaintext/ciphertext pairs.
Suppose we have an exponentially distributed random variable X : → R >0 , which models the solving time of a SAT-solver. We now have n independent variables X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n such that
where Exp(λ) refers to the exponential distribution with parameter λ. Each realization x i ∈ R >0 of X i (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) represents the measured solving time that a SAT-solver requires to solve the algebraic system, following the same distribution Exp(λ). Let t > 0 be a time threshold. The probability of the solving time of the ith variable being smaller or equal to the threshold time t is then defined as P(X i ≤ t) and accordingly P(X i > t) represents the probability that the solver is not able to solve the system within the threshold time t.
Let us assume that a SAT solver could determine a solution in the nth trial. Our goal is to minimize the overall solving time t total = nt. Since the exponential distribution Exp(λ) only converges slowly, we have to specify a level of confidence S ∈ [0, 1], which specifies the level of assurance we want to guarantee in finding a solution. For example, if we set S = 0.99, we can fix the threshold t and minimize the number t total such that it is guaranteed for 99 % of all instances that the solving time does not exceed t total . Using the above definitions, we formulate the following minimization problem:
Where P(X > t) n is the probability that the solver is not able to solve the system within the time limit t in n tries. Thus, 1 − P(X > t) n denotes the accumulated probability of the solver finding at least one solution within n tries using the time limit t. The total running time is then upper bounded by t total .
We include the computation of the time threshold t into IASCA by introducing an additional algebraic profiling phase as displayed in Fig. 8 . Having determined such a threshold, the attacker is then able to perform an algebraic attack, which presumably minimizes the overall solving time.
Evaluating the solving time
In the following, we show the benefit of restarting the SAT solver after a given threshold time by comparing the mean times without restarting the solver and when restarting the solver. We perform our experiments on the instances, depicted in Figs. 9 and 10 . We use the optimization problem in (Eq. 10) to determine the threshold time for which the mean solving time becomes minimal. Subsequently, we record another set of instances using the same scenarios and compute the mean time and mean number of required instances when restarting the SAT solver on the determined threshold time.
First, we determine the optimal threshold time on the instances where 50 HWs are known. For these instances, the mean solving time without restarting the SAT solver is 26.81 s. We set the desirable certainty to S = 0.99 7 and compute the total time we would require to achieve the certainty using each of the solving times as a threshold 8 . The number of required instances and the estimated solving time for each threshold are depicted in Table 10 .
As expected, we can observe a trade-off between the number of instances for which we restart the SAT solver and the threshold time. Since we assume no restriction on the number of instances during the attack phase, we use the threshold with the minimal worst time as time threshold. In our case, the expected time is minimal at around 26.6 s and is achieved for a time threshold of 3 s and a required number of instances 7 Note that we approximate the distribution, which may yield imprecise results. 8 Since we only have 100 realizations of the distribution we used each solving time as a threshold. This is, however, not a precise method since it does not include interpolation between the solving times. of nine. We repeated the experiments for the 50 HW scenario using the time threshold of 3 s and compute the overall time and number of required restarts. In total, we achieve a mean solving time of 5.39 s and a mean number of required instances of 2.3 which corresponds to a reduction of a factor of 5. The distribution of solving times is depicted in Fig. 11 . For the scenario employing 42 HWs, the mean solving time of the solved instances without restarting the SAT solver is 9,177 s. However, since only 52 % of all instances were solved, we use a mean time of 86,400 s for the remaining 48 %. Thus, we have an estimated mean time of 46,244 s, when not restarting the SAT solver. Similar to the 50 HW scenario above, we compute the threshold time as 4 s and require a restart of the SAT solver on 450 instances to guarantee that a solution is found to a certainty of 99 %. Note that the threshold time is indeed very small compared to the mean solving time. Using these settings, we repeated the experiments for this scenario until we determined a successful solution 100 times. The distribution of solving times is depicted in Fig. 12 . To determine 100 solutions we required a total of 25,010 instances. The number of required instances is rather high since we disregard an instance if we can not solve it in a time of 4 s. Thus, on average we require 250 instances to successfully determine one solution. However, the mean time for determining a solution is decreased to 511 s from the initial 46,244 s. This corresponds to a decrease in solving time of factor 90.
We summarize our results in Table 11 .
As we see, determining the time threshold turns out to be a useful idea, when optimizing the performance of a SAT solver. First the profiling phase has to be done to determine the threshold and then the determined value is to be used for the attack phase. The study we undertook here is not mathematically rigorous, but of practical value. We leave it as an interesting future work to work out theoretical background, which would not only benefit the IASCA, but also SAT-solving-based methods overall.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a practical algebraic side-channel attack, IASCA. The enhancements have been derived in two ways: First, we reduced the information required for solving the algebraic system. Compared to [1] , we could solve the algebraic system by only requiring two consecutive rounds or random 394 HWs for known plain-and ciphertext. Furthermore, if the plain-and ciphertext is not known we achieved a reduction to two rounds of required HWs.
Secondly, we considered the application of IASCA under the assumption of erroneous information. We conducted a single-trace template attack and analyzed the error distribution in detail in order to obtain a more practical view on the error rate. We then conducted IASCA on the erroneous predictions of the template attack. IASCA was able to solve the algebraic system in a few seconds, even though we provided the system with 91 % erroneous predictions. Also, we were able to cope with predictions that differ from the correct HW by an arbitrary distance. Thus, we outperformed [3] in the number of errors, the restrictions on errors, and required information.
In future work, we will try to decrease the size of clauses and increase the error handling to further enhance the error tolerance of IASCA. Also, we will evaluate a new approach, which allows us to solve hard instances by guessing the HW at certain intermediate values. Preliminary experiments indicate that we might be able to solve the algebraic system for threshold T = 98 in 100 % of the cases by guessing the HWs of only seven intermediate values. Thus, we would be less dependent on accurate side-channel information, which would further extend the applicability of IASCA.
